John W. Yolton, THE TWO INTELLECTUAL WORLDS OF JOHN LOCKE by Grenberg, Jeanine
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 24 Issue 1 Article 9 
1-1-2007 
Yolton, THE TWO INTELLECTUAL WORLDS OF JOHN LOCKE 
Jeanine Grenberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Grenberg, Jeanine (2007) "Yolton, THE TWO INTELLECTUAL WORLDS OF JOHN LOCKE," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 24 : Iss. 1 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol24/iss1/9 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and 
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
BOOK REVIEWS 107
suggestive in several areas. One is in addressing the broadly Aristotelian 
vs. Stoic dispute over the relation between happiness and enjoyment. Can 
one, by acting virtuously, suﬀ er genuine harm (and thus not experience 
fl ourishing in the sense of well-being), and still be “happy” in the mor-
ally rich sense of fl ourishing? On Porter’s interpretation of Aquinas, the 
answer is a qualifi ed, “yes.” Happiness and well-being are not equated; 
the att ainment of well-being is neither necessary nor suﬃ  cient for happi-
ness. However, the happy life is normally and properly an enjoyable life; 
the virtues and the capacities that they perfect are in fact aimed at the full 
functioning of human nature, i.e., well-being. Such a view, says Porter, 
“is at least suggestive that the joys and pleasures of the happy life are 
intimately bound up with enjoyment of those goods which are proper to 
the life of well-being” (p. 173). (Put diﬀ erently, Aquinas’s understanding 
of value does not, as some forms of consequentialism, reduce moral goods 
(happiness) to non-moral goods (well-being); yet it is able to account for 
the real goodness of the latt er as well as its relation to the former.) 
In Nature as Reason, Porter has added signifi cantly to the goods to be 
enjoyed in thinking about the natural law.
The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke, by John W. Yolton. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004. $35.00 (cloth)
JEANINE GRENBERG, St. Olaf College
John Yolton takes on a diﬃ  cult task in this book: to convince us that John 
Locke is not simply an empiricist, but that his thought is deeply and 
centrally informed by more speculative and conjectural, even religious 
and theological, concerns. Yolton is intrigued by pervasive references in 
Locke’s Essay and other works to “things obscure, hidden, and even noble 
and beautiful,” (p. 139) and this book is his eﬀ ort to convince us of the 
centrality of such things in Locke’s philosophy.
Yolton’s audience is thus “those who still cling to labeling Locke ‘em-
piricist’ (of whom there are fewer today),” (p. 137) and also those who 
tend to assume that Locke was interested only in att acking and reject-
ing central Christian doctrines. (p.  151) At the center of Yolton’s att ack 
against a narrowly empiricist and secular interpretation of Locke is the 
claim that Locke is in fact concerned with two “intellectual worlds”, one 
the more familiar, materialistic world accessed via sense experience and 
observation; the other a less att ended to Lockean world of “God, angels 
and spirits” accessed (or more accurately, imagined or thought of) via 
speculation and conjecture.
I am torn in trying to assess Yolton’s success in this task. On the one 
hand, we are indebted to him for uncovering a host of interesting tex-
tual references in Locke’s works which suggest of Locke escaping his 
empiricist bounds, and which enigmatically hint at a Lockean concern 
for this second, more spiritual, intellectual world. For example, in the 
Fourth Book of the Essay, Locke speaks of the goal of “natural philoso-
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phy” as “bare speculative Truth, and whatsoever can aﬀ ord the Mind of 
Man any such, . . . whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or 
any of their Aﬀ ections, as Number, and Figure, etc.” (Essay, 4.21.2, quoted 
at p. 46) Similarly, Locke surprisingly for an empiricist, suggests that, 
“[W]hatsoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts . . . is but a 
point, almost nothing, in comparison of the rest.” (Essay, 4.3.23, quoted 
at p. 49) Yolton appeals not only to the Essay, but also to less familiar 
works, including The Reasonableness of Christianity, “Of the Conduct of the 
Understanding,” and Some Thoughts Concerning Education to make his ar-
gument. We should be grateful to him for amassing these citations for our 
consideration, for they surely do raise interesting questions about Locke’s 
basic philosophical orientation.
There are problems, however, with the extent to which these texts can 
make Yolton’s case. First, with just a few notable exceptions, the texts to 
which he appeals almost invariably make only indirect reference to a spir-
itual world, usually within the context of saying that we can say nothing 
of this world, and so should be content not to. The larger, more positive 
claims which Yolton hopes to draw from them thus sit on shaky textual 
ground. When, for example, Locke speaks of the soul, it is usually within 
the context of questioning the purported “’demonstrations and undoubted 
Propositions’” about it which in fact fail to advance knowledge at all. (Es-
say, 4.8.9, quoted at p. 54) There are even times when texts which Yolton 
fi nds “att ention grabbing” for their non-empiricist fl avor, leave the reader 
cold, and perplexed at Yolton’s more vigorous response. He quotes, for 
example, the following as indicating a deep concern for “things hidden 
and unknown”:
And if there are things obscure, sublime, and noble, which even rea-
son itself may marvel at and bring forth and proclaim as a discovery, 
yet, if you would run through each single speculative science, there 
is none in which something is not always presupposed and taken for 
granted and derived from the senses by way of borrowing.” (Essays 
on the Law of Nature, 151, quoted at p. 139)
This is less-than-convincing textual evidence for Locke’s positive concern 
for things “obscure, sublime and noble.” Locke seems here to be introduc-
ing a defl ationary, empiricist reading of things purported to be obscure, 
sublime and noble, instead of indicating an awe-fi lled appreciation for such 
spiritual entities.
Ultimately though, the larger problem with Yolton’s eﬀ ort is that it 
doesn’t seem quite fi nished. There may indeed be secure textual basis for 
some non-empiricist leanings in Locke, but the book we have before us 
does not do enough with these intriguing texts to make that argument. 
Indeed, at times the book reads in a draft -like, rather text-heavy fashion, 
introducing copious references from Locke which go uninterpreted. When 
we do receive interpretation, it is oft en in a more lexicon-like style, cata-
loguing the use of individual words (e.g., “person”, “soul”, “creature”) in 
Locke’s texts, but not convincing us of a larger, positive program of specu-
lative or spiritual concern. And oft en, discussions of individual bits of text 
end with a query, or hesitant suggestion, rather than a conclusion. For ex-
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ample, Yolton ends a discussion of the happiness of God by saying: “Per-
haps the happiness of spirits (and God) is just their superior knowledge.” 
(p. 82, emphasis added)
In the end, Yolton has succeeded in intriguing me, but not convincing 
me. It is at best an uphill batt le to engage in the task which Yolton has un-
dertaken for himself, and it may be that he has done the best that could be 
done with what is to be found in Locke’s text. But if there are speculative, 
theological and spiritual concerns positively informing Locke’s philosophy, 
we have yet to fully uncover it.
Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, edited by Sohail H. Hashmi and 
Stephen Lee. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, xiii + 533 
pages, $85.00 hardback, $37.99 paperback.
TOMIS KAPITAN, Northern Illinois University
This book is devoted to ethical issues concerning the use, deployment, 
possession, and regulation of so-called “weapons of mass destruction” 
(WMD). The topics are approached from a broad range of theoretical and 
practical perspectives, with nearly half the space given to the views of six 
major religious traditions. Also included are essays representing political 
realism, natural law ethics, liberalism, feminism, and pacifi sm. Contribu-
tors were asked to address six questions:
• What are the general norms concerning the use of weapons in war?
• Is it ever justifi ed to use WMD in warfare?
• Is it ever justifi ed to develop and deploy WMD as deterrents?
• If some nations possess WMD, is it proper to deny possession to 
others?
• Should there be a WMD disarmament?
• What are the policy options of the major ethical traditions concern-
ing WMD?
This technique serves not only to distinguish major positions, depending 
on how these questions are answered, but also to facilitate comparison 
among the represented viewpoints. For the most part, the volume is his-
torically sophisticated, sensitive to contemporary political concerns, and 
replete with state of the art thinking about the ethics of WMD. With its 
breadth and thorough index, it would be an excellent text for use in courses 
devoted to war, violence, and international confl ict.
The editors note that there is some diﬃ  culty in determining what counts 
as WMD. Typically, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are cited, 
but the question has been raised whether such mechanisms as economic 
sanctions and machetes shouldn’t also be included, since both were used 
to destroy hundreds of thousands of lives in the 1990s. Perhaps the best 
distinction between WMD and “conventional” weapons is that the former 
